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A FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF THE RULE OF LENITY: DOES
THEFT OF MISADDRESSED MAIL VIOLATE THE
FEDERAL MAIL THEFT STATUTE?
INTRODUCTION
For over two hundred years, the United States Postal Service ("Postal
Service") has served as the keystone of the American communication
system. In recognition of the vital role that the Postal Service plays in
both the commercial and private sectors, Congress has provided criminal
penalties for a wide range of activities that interfere with the operations
of the Postal Service.' One such provision, the federal mail theft statute,
Section 1708 of Title 18,2 is designed to protect the "sanctity and integ-
rity' 3 of the mail by punishing those who steal mail while it is under the
duty and authority of the Postal Service.4 Section 1708, however, does
1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1738 (1982).
2. The statute provides:
Whoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains, or at-
tempts so to obtain, from or out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter
box, mail receptacle, or any mail route or other authorized depository for mail
matter, or from a letter or mail carrier, any letter, postal card, package, bag, or
mail, or abstracts or removes from any such letter, package, bag, or mail, any
article or thing contained therein, or secretes, embezzles, or destroys any such
letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained
therein;
Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, ch.
645, § 1708, 62 Stat. 683, 779).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 1674, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 1853-57; S. Rep. No. 980, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951); cf United
States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that the statute was
designed to protect the integrity of the mails), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
4. See United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921
(1972).
The government must prove three elements to sustain a conviction under section 1708.
See United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1958). First, the government must
prove that the article was stolen from the "mail". See 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1982). This
element has "consistently [been] construed so as not to require direct proof of theft or
taking from the mails." United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376, 381 (1st Cir. 1979).
If the government proves that the article was mailed to the addressee, see, e.g., Webb v.
United States, 347 F.2d 363, 363-64 (10th Cir. 1965) (proof of routine procedures of state
welfare department in preparation and mailing of welfare checks was sufficient to support
inference that check reached the mail), that it was never received by the addressee and
that it was subsequently found in defendant's possession, the fact finder may infer, absent
a contrary explanation, that the article was stolen from the mail. See Hines, 256 F.2d at
564; accord Indelicato, 611 F.2d at 384; United States v. Matzker, 473 F.2d 408, 411 (8th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Lopez, 457 F.2d 396, 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866
(1972); see also Whitehorn v. United States, 380 F.2d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 1967) (same
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not prohibit theft of a letter or package after it leaves the "mail."' There-
fore, judicial interpretation of when an article is in the "mail" is critical
to an understanding of the scope of section 1708.
A correctly addressed and properly delivered article is in the "mail"
under the federal mail theft statute from the time that it is properly
mailed by the sender until it is delivered by the Postal Service to the
intended recipient at the correct address.' Once the intended recipient
lawfully removes such an article from the mailbox, his objectives and
those of the sender are met; the article is no longer in the "mail" and any
subsequent theft of that article falls outside the purview of section 1708.'
Quite often, however, mail is "misaddressed" by the sender or "mis-
inference is permissible if item was sent to addressee's former residence after addressee
had filed a proper notice of change of address).
This inference, however, will not ease the government's burden when the indictment
charges theft from a particular mail receptacle. See Indelicato, 611 F.2d at 381-82. In
such cases, the defendant must have formed the intent to steal before or at the instant the
article is removed from the authorized depository. See supra note 12; Allen v. United
States, 387 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1968); Goodman v. United States, 341 F.2d 272, 273
(5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam). If this intent is subsequently formed, courts have found that
the misappropriation took place after the article left the mail and that the unlawful activ-
ity fell outside the purview of section 1708. See Allen, 387 F.2d at 643; Goodman, 341
F.2d at 273.
Second, the government must prove that defendant possessed the stolen article. See
Hines, 256 F.2d at 563.
Third, the government must prove that the defendant knew that the article was stolen.
See id. To prove this element, the government does not have to show defendant knew
that the article was stolen from the mail, but simply that he knew it was stolen. See
Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 847 & n.14 (1973); Smith v. United States, 343
F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 861 (1965); Hines, 256 F.2d at 563. But
see United States v. Lynn, 461 F.2d 759, 761-62 (10th Cir. 1972) (requiring proof that
defendant knew credit card he possessed was stolen from the mail).
Before 1939, however, the statute explicitly required proof that defendant knew the
article was stolen from the mail. See 18 U.S.C. § 317 (1934), as amended by 18 U.S.C.
§ 1708 (1982); Barnes, 412 U.S. at 847 n.14; see also Brandenburg v. United States, 78
F.2d 811, 812 (3d Cir. 1935) (government failed to establish, under section 317, that
defendant knew the article he possessed was stolen from the mail). The statute was later
amended to only require proof that defendant knew the mail in his possession was stolen.
See Barnes, 412 U.S. at 847 n.14. This alleviated an almost impossible burden cast on the
government to show that an accused knew how the article in his possession was stolen.
See Smith, 343 F.2d at 543; Hines, 256 F.2d at 563; H.R. Rep. No. 734, 76th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1939); S. Rep. No. 864, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. (1939).
The jury may infer that the defendant knew the mail was stolen if the government
proves he possessed the stolen mail and cannot explain how he came to possess it. See
United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376, 384 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing Barnes, 412 U.S. at
841).
5. See Allen v. United States, 387 F.2d 641, 642 (5th Cir. 1968); see, e.g., United
States v. Logwood, 360 F.2d 905, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1966) (letter stolen from addressee's
landlady was not in the "mail" when stolen).
6. See United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 525 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3166 (1989); Logwood, 360 F.2d at 907-08.
7. See Palmer, 864 F.2d at 525; Logwood, 360 F.2d at 907-08.
8. Misaddressed mail is mail that "bears an address other than the residence of the
person to whom it was sent." Palmer, 864 F.2d at 526. It can take one of two forms-
either the sender has made a mistake in addressing the envelope (usually due to typo-
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delivered" 9 by the Postal Service. In both cases, the Postal Service's ini-
tial delivery of the article fails to reach the intended recipient, thwarting
his objectives and those of the sender. Every court that has considered
the question to date has held that the term "mail" in section 1708 in-
cludes misdelivered mail that is stolen after the initial delivery by the
Postal Service and the lawful removal of the article by the unintended
recipient.10 However, courts disagree on whether the term "mail" under
section 1708 includes misaddressed mail that is stolen after its lawful re-
moval from the authorized depository at the place of initial delivery.11
Under one view, section 1708 does not apply to theft of misaddressed
mail because the unintended recipient of the misaddressed article must
form the intent to steal it before or at the instant he realizes it is in his
mail receptacle."2 Under this narrow view, the Postal Service's duty and
graphical error), or the article is out-of-date because the addressee has moved. See id. at
527.
9. Misdelivered mail is mail that is "left at an address other than the one on the
envelope." Id. at 525-26.
10. See id. at 527; United States v. Lavin, 567 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Anton, 547 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921 (1972).
11. Compare United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988) (theft of
misaddressed mail is a section 1708 violation), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989) and
United States v. Douglas, 668 F.2d 459, 461 & n.3 (10th Cir.) (sustaining section 1708
conviction in case involving theft of misaddressed mail), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108
(1982) and United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376, 381-82 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating
elements of section 1708 offense in a way that covers misaddressed mail) with United
States v. Lavin, 567 F.2d 579, 583 (3d Cir. 1977) (interpreting section 1708 to include
theft of misdelivered mail but implying there is no section 1708 violation for theft of
misaddressed mail) and United States v. Anton, 547 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1976) (same)
and United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 83, 87-90 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
921 (1972) and Allen v. United States, 387 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1968) (theft of misad-
dressed mail not a section 1708 violation) and Goodman v. United States, 341 F.2d 272,
273 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (same).
12. See Davis, 461 F.2d at 88-89; Allen, 387 F.2d at 643; Goodman, 341 F.2d at 273.
The Ninth Circuit, however, has applied section 1708 to theft of misaddressed mail in the
case of out-of-date mail, but only if a proper change-of-address form has been filed. See
United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir. 1971).
The practical impossibility of satisfying this instantaneously formed intent requirement
effectively precludes application of the statute to cases involving theft of misaddressed
mail. An unintended recipient cannot form the intent to steal a misaddressed article until
he learns that it has been delivered to him. Almost without exception, he will not realize
that he has received it until he removes it from his mailbox, at which time, under the
narrow view, it is no longer in the mails for purposes of the statute.
According to the First Circuit, the courts adhering to the narrow view erroneously
conclude that section 1708 cannot cover theft of misaddressed mail because of the instan-
taneously formed intent requirement. In United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376 (1st
Cir. 1979), the First Circuit, recognizing that the statute prohibits theft from any "mail,
... mail receptacle, or any mail route or other authorized depository for mail matter,"
determined that the term "mail" is broader than the term "mail receptacle." See id. at
381 n.4 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1982)). "While proof of theft of materials from a
receptacle.., obviously would prove theft from the mails, it is equally obvious that proof
of theft from the mails would not necessarily prove theft from a postal receptacle." Id. at
381.
This distinction is significant to the operation of the permissible inference established in
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authority over all mail terminates once it delivers the article to the ad-
dress that the sender has specified and the article is lawfully removed
from that mail receptacle. 3
United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561, 563-64 (2d Cir. 1958). In Hines, the court con-
cluded that absent a contrary explanation, the trier of fact can infer that materials were
stolen from the mail if the government can show that the materials were mailed, that the
addressee never received them and the defendant later possessed the materials. When
operative, the Hines inference obviates any problem with proving instantaneously formed
intent. See Indelicato, 611 F.2d at 381-82. The Indelicato panel determined that the
Hines inference permits the trier of fact to infer theft from the mail, although it does not
allow the more specific inference of theft from a particular mail receptacle. See id.
Therefore, the Hines inference overrides this restrictive requirement when the charge is
theft from the "mail" generally, even for thefts of misaddressed mail. From a procedural
standpoint, theft of misaddressed mail can violate the statute if the indictment charges
theft from the "mail" and the government proves the elements of the Hines inference.
See id.; see also United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 525 (7th Cir. 1988) (Defendants
"were not charged with stealing out of a 'letter box [or] mail receptacle,' which would
make [defendant's] intent at the time of the withdrawal pertinent. They were charged
with stealing out of the 'mail.' "), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
13. Under this view, theft of misdelivered mail is a section 1708 violation, but theft of
misaddressed mail is not. See Anton, 547 F.2d at 495; Davis, 461 F.2d at 88-89; cf Lavin,
567 F.2d at 581 n.6 (court finds distinction between misaddressed and misdelivered mail
significant in section 1708 context, thereby implying theft of misaddressed mail is not a
section 1708 violation).
In Davis, a postman mistakenly delivered an envelope, properly addressed to a third
party, to the front counter of defendant's pharmacy. The envelope was removed from
defendant's mail receptacle and transferred to his desk at the back of the pharmacy where
it was mistakenly opened. Rather than delivering the envelope, which contained 100
money orders, to the proper addressee or returning it to the Postal Service, the proprietor
instructed his employee to cash them. Davis, 461 F.2d at 84-85. The court held that, for
the purposes of section 1708, "the duty and authority of the Postal Service over mail
placed in its custody ceases to exist once a letter is delivered to the address which the
sender has specified and is lawfully removed from a letterbox or other mail receptacle."
Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Fifth Circuit carved out a new rule for misdelivered mail stating that a "mis-
delivered letter continues in the custody of the postal service, and therefore remains in the
'mail,' until it has been returned to the sender or delivered to its addressee." Id. (emphasis
added). This holding expands the scope of section 1708 protection for cases of misdeliv-
ered mail beyond the protection provided in ordinary situations and in cases involving
misaddressed mail. Under the Davis rule, the lawful removal of misdelivered mail from
the authorized depository at the place of initial delivery does not terminate section 1708
protection. See id. Therefore, the exact time at which the unintended recipient forms the
intent to steal the misaddressed mail is irrelevant. The article remains in the mails at all
times while the misdelivered article is in the unintended recipient's hands, even if his
intent to steal is formed after he removes the item from the authorized mail receptacle.
Therefore, any theft of that article is a section 1708 violation. See id.
In Anton, the court stated that:
The distinction between improperly addressed mail and misdelivered mail is
crucial ....
.... The Postal Service has a duty to deliver postal matter to the address
indicated by the sender. When it satisfies this obligation and the material is
received at that address, its concomitant authority over the mail ends. Con-
versely, when the Postal Service misdelivers an item, thus breaching its duty, its
authority over the item continues after the item is received.
Anton, 547 F.2d at 495 (emphasis added).
THE RULE OF LENITY
Under another approach, however, courts treat theft of misaddressed
mail in the same way as theft of misdelivered mail; under this view, theft
of misaddressed mail is covered by section 1708.14 In United States v.
Palmer,'5 the principal case supporting this broad interpretation of the
statute, Judge Easterbrook chose to disregard a long-standing canon of
interpretation of penal statutes, the rule of strict construction known as
the "rule of lenity."16
The rule of lenity provides that "penal statutes should be strictly con-
strued against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory
penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be
imposed."' 17 Had Judge Easterbrook properly applied the rule, he could
not have construed the statute to include theft of misaddressed mail.
Therefore, in order to reach the result he wanted, Judge Easterbrook
adopted a functional view of the rule that is both misguided and
unprecedented.
This Note argues that although the statute should be interpreted to
include theft of misaddressed mail, Judge Easterbrook's approach in
Palmer was improper. Part I outlines the traditional process of statutory
analysis focusing on when and how the rule of lenity is applied. Part II
applies this traditional analysis to section 1708 and examines how the
functional view of the rule of lenity that Judge Easterbrook adopted cir-
cumvents this traditional approach. Part III analyzes Judge Easter-
brook's approach and concludes that his functional view of the rule of
lenity is flawed. Finally, Part IV reviews the compelling policy argu-
ments in favor of applying section 1708 to theft of misaddressed mail.
I. TRADITIONAL STATUTORY ANALYSIS
The first step in determining whether a specific act violates a penal
statute is analyzing the language of the statute.18 When the statutory
language is unambiguous, the "plain meaning" rule applies.' 9 The plain
meaning rule provides that "Where the language is plain and admits of
no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and
14. See Palmer, 864 F.2d at 527; see also United States v. Douglas, 668 F.2d 459
(10th Cir.) (sustaining conviction under section 1708 in a case involving theft of misad-
dressed mail), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982); United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d
376, 381-82 (Ist Cir. 1979) (stating the elements of a section 1708 offense in a way that
covers misaddressed mail).
15. 864 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
16. Id. at 527-28.
17. 3 N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.03, at 11 (4th ed. 1986); see
infra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
18. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). "It is elementary that the
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act
is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the
law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according
to its terms." Id. at 485; see 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.01, at
73 (4th ed. 1984).
19. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 18, § 46.01, at 73.
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the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."20
When the statutory language is ambiguous, however, the plain meaning
rule does not govern and judicial interpretation is required.2" In this in-
stance, the judiciary must ascertain the legislative intent behind the stat-
ute.22 If legislative history removes ambiguity from the statute, judicial
interpretation must be in accord with legislative intent.23
If the statute remains ambiguous after legislative intent is scrutinized,
courts should apply the rule of lenity.24 The rule of lenity requires that
courts construe penal statutes strictly against the state.2" The judiciary
of eighteenth-century England devised the rule in an effort to "stem the
march to the gallows" caused by the "vast and irrational proliferation of
capital offenses" that resulted from the apparent blood-lust of the
Parliament.26
The rule of lenity is essential because it implements the principle of
legality, a fundamental principle of criminal law that forbids the creation
of crimes by the judiciary.27 Moreover, the rule of lenity embraces the
concepts of separation of powers, notice and the rule of law. 28 Separa-
tion of powers mandates the division of the legislative, executive and ju-
dicial branches to ensure the liberty of a representative democracy.29
Because the legislature, not the judiciary, has the power to enforce socie-
tal judgments through the penal law, separation of powers cannot be pre-
served unless judges are prevented from construing statutory mandates
liberally.3° The notice rationale provides that crimes must be clearly de-
20. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485; see United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 399
(1805) ("Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or
limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly ex-
pressed, and consequently, no room is left for construction."); see also 2A N. Singer,
supra note 18, § 46.01, at 73 and cases cited therein.
21. See T. Sedgwick, Statutory Construction 195 (2d ed. 1874) ("It is only when the
language is ambiguous that the courts are called on to construe or interpret").
22. See id.
23. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 18, § 45.05, at 20-22.
24. 3 N. Singer, supra note 17, § 59.03, at 11 and cases cited therein.
The United States Supreme Court recently reasserted its "longstanding recognition of
the principle that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved
in favor of lenity.'" Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (quoting Rewis
v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)); see Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406-
07 (1980); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971).
25. See Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L.
Rev. 189, 198 (1985).
26. See Jeffries, supra note 25, at 198; see also Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of
Penal Statutes, 48 .Harv. L. Rev. 748, 748-51 (1935) (doctrine of strict construction
emerged against the background of unmitigated severity in penalties for serious crimes
prior to the nineteenth century).
27. See Jeffries, supra note 25, at 190. The principle of legality forbids the retroactive
definition of crimes because it is desirable to have a clear knowledge of what constitutes
criminal misconduct in advance. See id.
28. See id. at 201-19.
29. See id. at 202.
30. See id.
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fined so that individuals have fair warning of what is forbidden.3' Notice
ensures that the statute does not trap the innocent and does not violate
due process of law.32 The rule of law provides that courts should apply
known principles or laws without the intervention of discretion.33 Such
restraint encourages equal treatment under the law and accountability in
the use of government power.34
II. APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF LENITY TO THE FEDERAL MAIL
THEFT STATUTE
The ambiguities in the language of section 170831 obviate the applica-
tion of the plain meaning rule. Therefore, courts must analyze the legis-
lative intent behind the statute to determine whether theft of
misaddressed mail after initial delivery is a section 1708 violation. De-
spite the statute's long history and many amendments, 36 however,
"[tihere is almost no legislative history worth reading. '37 What little
there is suggests only that section 1708 was designed to protect the
"sanctity and integrity" of the United States postal system.38 Because
31. See id. at 205.
32. See id. (citing Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
33. Black's Law Dictionary 1196 (5th ed. 1979).
34. See Jeffries, supra note 25, at 212.
35. See supra note 2.
36. Congress enacted the current federal mail theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1982)
(originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, ch. 645, § 1708, 62 Stat.
683, 779), in 1948 as part of the comprehensive revision of the federal criminal laws. The
first statute protecting the mail, enacted in 1792, punished violators with death. The
statute provided:
[I]f any person or persons shall rob any carrier of the mail of the United States,
of such mail, or if any person shall rob the mail, in which letters are sent to be
conveyed by post, of any letter or packet, or shall steal such mail, or shall steal
and take from or out of the same, or from or out of any post-office, any letter or
packet, such offender or offenders shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death.
Act of February 20, 1792, § 17, 1 Stat. 237 (emphasis added). By 1872, however, Con-
gress had mitigated this harsh penalty for mail theft, punishing violators with fines and
imprisonment of up to five years. See 70 Rev. Stat. §§ 5469, 5470, 18 Stat. 1066 (1873).
Congress has transformed the statute from one that, hundreds of years ago, served
predominantly to punish "depredations of highwaymen," to one that now must contend
with the "anonymity of the modem postal system." Smith v. United States, 343 F.2d
539, 542 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 861 (1965). However, it is up to "judicial
appraisal of the realities of delivering and receiving mail in a modem urban environment"
to further protect the sanctity and integrity of the mails. Id.
37. United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3166 (1989).
38. See H.R. Rep. No. 1674, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1853-57; S. Rep. No. 980, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951); cf
Palmer, 864 F.2d at 527 (recognizing that the statute was designed to protect the integ-
rity of the mails).
The Second Circuit determined that "[t]he variety of terms employed in the statute
indicates that it was broadly conceived to assure the proper functioning of the postal
system," United States v. Lopez, 457 F.2d 396, 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866
(1972), and many courts have interpreted terms of the statute liberally to further broaden
the statute's scope. For example, the terms "mail," "mail route," "mail receptacle" and
1989]
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this imprecise language does not eliminate ambiguity from the statute, 9
traditional statutory analysis requires that the rule of lenity be applied.
Accordingly, courts should interpret the term "mail" narrowly and ex-
clude thefts of misaddressed mail from the purview of section 1708.
In United States v. Palmer,4" however, Judge Easterbrook refused to
allow the rule of lenity to dictate a narrow reading of the statute.41 In
Palmer, approximately one month after settling into a new residence, one
of the defendants found three envelopes in her mailbox that were ad-
dressed to the former occupant.42 Instead of returning the envelopes, the
defendant opened them and found three checks which she later at-
tempted to negotiate.43
In deciding whether the defendant's acts violated section 1708, Judge
Easterbrook adopted a "functional" view of the rule of lenity, stating
that "[t]he rule of lenity ...extends no further than the function it
serves. It does not preclude the implementation of the criminal law every
time a statute needs construction, for all enactments require elucida-
tion."'  After acknowledging the underlying principles behind the
"other authorized depository for mail matter" have been liberally construed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Rosen, 245 U.S. 467, 472-73 (1918) (unlocked boxes in hallway are au-
thorized depositories); United States v. Douglas, 668 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir.) (envelope
clipped to rod permanently attached to mailbox is in "mail receptacle"), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1108 (1982); United States v. White, 510 F.2d 448, 451 (10th Cir. 1975) (mail
clipped by a clothespin to a mailbox lid is in a "mail receptacle"); Lopez, 457 F.2d at 399
(mail left on floor of hallway is in a "mail route"); United States v. Smith, 343 F.2d 539,
542-43 (5th Cir.) (unlocked box placed just inside front door of hotel and used for general
delivery of mail to all residents is authorized depository), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 861
(1965).
This broad interpretative pattern is further demonstrated by cases holding that the
statute covers misdelivered mail even if it is stolen after it was lawfully removed from an
officially authorized mail receptacle. See United States v. Lavin, 567 F.2d 579, 583 (3d
Cir. 1977); United States v. Anton, 547 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Davis, 461 F.2d 83, 88-89 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921 (1972).
Despite the line of cases construing the terms in section 1708 broadly, courts have
recognized certain limitations. See, e.g., United States v. Logwood, 360 F.2d 905, 907-08
(7th Cir. 1966) (landlady's windowsill not an authorized mail depository); Heubner v.
United States, 28 F.2d 929, 930 (6th Cir. 1928) (open pasteboard box on windowsill lo-
cated on second floor and far removed from entrance of building not an "authorized
depository for mail matter"); United States v. Lophansky, 232 F. 297, 298 (E.D. Pa.
1916) (top of a letter box not an authorized mail depository); United States v. Thomas,
361 F. Supp. 978, 980 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (mail parcel delivered to addressee's front porch
because it did not fit into mailbox not in an "authorized depository for mail matter");
United States v. Askey, 108 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D. Tex 1952) (floor in a private home,
where mail was delivered to several persons, equally accessible to all and was delivered by
dropping mail through a small letter slot in the wall beside front door not an "authorized
depository for mail matter"). These cases, however, should not be construed as preclud-
ing application of the statute to misaddressed mail.
39. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
40. 864 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
41. See id. at 527-28.
42. See id. at 525.
43. See id.
44. Id. at 527.
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rule-separation of powers, notice and the rule of law-Judge Easter-
brook decided that these goals would not be furthered by a narrow read-
ing of the term "mail."45 Focusing entirely on the "notice" rationale,
Judge Easterbrook determined that the defendants were on notice that
their conduct was unlawful under either state law or Section 1702 of
Title 18, a statute complementary to section 1708.46 He reasoned that
because "[t]he penalty provisions of § 1702 and § 1708 are identical...
[a]n application of the rule of lenity would simply transfer this prosecu-
tion to § 1702-leading straight to the same outcome--or to state law."47
45. See id. at 528.
46. See id. Section 1702 provides:
Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any
authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or
which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of
any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it
was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the
business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the
same, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1702 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, ch.
645, § 1702, 62 Stat. 683, 778).
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits compared section 1708 with section 1702 and con-
cluded that section 1702 is broader. Section 1702 provides protection for mail until it is
physically delivered to the person to whom it was directed, while section 1708 protection
terminates when the article is lawfully removed from the mail receptacle. See United
States v. Ashford, 530 F.2d 792 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Logwood, 360 F.2d 905
(7th Cir. 1966).
In Ashford, the Eighth Circuit held that although "[t]he protection of § 1708 is limited
to mail matter which is still in the possession or control of the Postal Service or which has
been placed in an authorized receptacle for mail matter such as a private letter box and
which has not lawfully been removed therefrom," Ashford, 530 F.2d at 795-96, the pro-
tection extended by section 1702 does not end "until the mailed material is physically
delivered to the person to whom it is directed or to his authorized agent." Id. at 795. In
Logwood, the Seventh Circuit noted that "it is obvious from the differences in the specific
language and terminology employed that § 1708 is not intended to and does not reach as
far as § 1702 extends." Logwood, 360 F.2d at 908.
It might be argued that because of the existence of section 1702, the scope of section
1708 should always terminate at the instant the article is lawfully removed from the mail
receptacle. This argument, however, cannot withstand scrutiny because every court that
has considered whether an exception to the narrower interpretation of section 1708 is
warranted for misdelivered mail has adopted such an exception, see United States v. La-
vin, 567 F.2d 579, 583 (3d. Cir. 1977); United States v. Anton, 547 F.2d 493, 495-96 (9th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921
(1972), thus lengthening the operative period of the statute to match or even exceed that
of section 1702. Recognizing the legislative intent to protect the mails and the modem
realities of delivering and receiving mail, those courts hold that the duty and authority of
the Postal Service does not end when the mail is misdelivered; rather, they continue until
the mail has been returned to the sender or delivered to its addressee. See Lavin, 567
F.2d at 583; Davis, 461 F.2d at 88-89; qf Anton, 547 F.2d at 495 (recognizing that in
some instances Postal Service's duty may not continue until the mail is returned to sender
or delivered to its addressee). Because these courts have broadened the scope of section
1708 in these cases, it cannot be argued that section 1708 should always cover a narrow
time period solely because of the existence of section 1702.
47. United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3166 (1989).
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Judge Easterbrook also examined the interests and expectations of
senders, unintended recipients, intended recipients and the Postal Ser-
vice. He concluded that from the perspectives of these parties, misdeliv-
ered and misaddressed mail are the same.4" The sender's interest is in
ensuring that the intended recipient receives mail at the correct ad-
dress.49 From the sender's viewpoint, the consequences of a misad-
dressed article and a misdelivered article are the same because in either
case the mail does not reach the intended recipient. Similarly, the in-
tended recipient's expectation to receive the mail is thwarted upon initial
delivery by the Postal Service whether mail is misdelivered or
misaddressed. °
In contrast, the unintended recipient has no legitimate interest in re-
ceiving mail that the sender does not intend him to have. Judge Easter-
brook reasoned that whether the unintended recipient receives an article
that is misaddressed or misdelivered, he learns that the mail does not
belong to him by simply looking at the envelope. 1 Knowing that the
item was meant for someone else, the unintended recipient should return
it to the Postal Service. 2 Finally, the Postal Service's has the same inter-
est in making further attempts to deliver mail to the addressee or in re-
turning it to the sender whether the mail is misaddressed or
misdelivered.5 3 Although in the case of out-of-date mail54 the filing of a
proper change-of-address form makes the Postal Service's continuing ob-
ligation easier to fulfill,5" the failure to file this form does not entitle the
48. See id. at 527.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. The Seventh Circuit, in Palmer, disagreed with the Fifth Circuit and char-
acterized the Fifth Circuit view as totally foreclosing the application of section 1708 to
misaddressed mail, stating that the Fifth Circuit held "that § 1708 does not apply to mail
after it reaches the address on the envelope." Id.
Theoretically, however, it is possible to violate section 1708, even under the Fifth Cir-
cuit's view, if the recipient of misaddressed mail forms an intent to steal it "at the time it
was removed from his post office box, or at the time hefirst discovered it as being in his
mail." Goodman v. United States, 341 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (em-
phasis added). The recipient may first discover an envelope in his mail at the moment he
removes it from the mailbox, when he first sifts through the mail or sometime thereafter.
Although the Fifth Circuit adopted the instantaneously formed intent requirement, see
supra notes 4 & 12 and accompanying text, the statute could apply to misaddressed mail
even in the Fifth Circuit if, for example, the recipient decides to steal the misaddressed
article as he is sifting through his mail or decides before he sees it that he will steal it. See
Allen v. United States, 387 F.2d 641, 642-43 (5th Cir. 1968); Goodman, 341 F.2d at 273;
see also United States v. Anton, 547 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 1976) ("The situations in
which one would have the requisite intent to steal at the moment he withdraws his mail
from its receptacle [or first discovers it in his mail] are few. In the normal case ... only
after removal does the intent arise and the theft occur.") (emphasis added).
54. See supra note 8.
55. See United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3166 (1989). Even the Ninth Circuit, which adheres to the restrictive view of
misaddressed mail, adopts the position that the scope of the statute does not terminate
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Postal Service to leave the mail with the occupant or entitle the recipient
to open it without penalty. 6 Thus, if given the opportunity, the Postal
Service will attempt to remedy either error by delivering the article to the
proper addressee or returning the article to the sender without charging
additional postage.
Judge Easterbrook concluded that because "[e]very court that has spo-
ken to the question has held ... that § 1708 covers misdelivered mail"5
and because the interests of the parties are the same whether mail is mis-
addressed or misdelivered, the statute should be interpreted to include
thefts of misaddressed mail. 59 Furthermore, because no court had given
a persuasive reason for distinguishing between misdelivered and misad-
dressed mail and the legislative history of the statute indicated "that
§ 1708 was designed to protect the [sanctity and] integrity of the
mails,"' Judge Easterbrook decided that a broad application of the stat-
ute was warranted in order to encourage unintended recipients of misad-
dressed mail to return it to the Postal Service.61
upon initial delivery of out-of-date mail as long as the intended recipient filed a proper
change-of-address form. See United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.
1971).
56. See Palmer, 864 F.2d at 527.
57. See id.; supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
58. Id.
59. See id. Although the Palmer court specifically mentions "first class" mail in dic-
tum, the holding is not limited to first class mail, stating that "§ 1708 applies to misad-
dressed mail." Id. Nevertheless, the statute will almost always be implicated in cases
involving first-class mail because a check or credit card is usually sent first-class. How-
ever, in the case of theft of mail sent under another classification, the statute should still
be implicated under the Palmer holding.
60. Id.; see H.R. Rep. No. 1674, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 1853-57; S. Rep. No. 980, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1951).
61. See United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3166 (1989). The Palmer court relied on opinions from the First and Tenth Cir-
cuits to support its argument that misaddressed mail and misdelivered mail should be
treated similarly for purposes of section 1708.
The Palmer court relied on United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376 (1st Cir. 1979),
and concluded that although the First Circuit "did not consider misaddressed mail as a
separate category [it] stated the elements of the § 1708 offense in a way that covers misad-
dressed envelopes." Palmer, 864 F.2d at 526.
Palmer also cited United States v. Douglas, 668 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1108 (1982), in which the Tenth Circuit sustained a conviction under section 1708 in
a case involving theft of misaddressed mail. In Douglas, the payee of a social security
check had recently moved and the check in question was delivered to the mailbox at his
old address. The new occupant removed the envelope from the mailbox and later clothes-
pinned it, unopened, with the check inside, to a metal rod attached to the mailbox. Sub-
sequently, both the envelope and the check disappeared. Defendant took the envelope
and negotiated the check. See id. at 461.
The defendants in Palmer advanced the argument that in Douglas, the article ceased to
be in the "mail" with the initial deposit in the mail box and re-entered the "mail" when
the occupant clipped the envelope to the post. Thus, they argued that the Douglas court
concluded that extending the protection of the statute to cover misaddressed mail was
unnecessary. The Palmer court rejected this theory, reasoning that the Douglas court
explicitly concluded that because of the rule favoring broad construction of the statute
'[a]n item does not cease to be mail within the custody of the postal system until it is
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
III. JUDGE EASTERBROOK'S FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF THE RULE OF
LENITY
Although the result reached in Palmer-that section 1708 should be
interpreted to include theft of misaddressed mail-is sound, Judge Eas-
terbrook's analysis was flawed in several ways. First, a major premise of
Judge Easterbrook's functional view of the rule of lenity was that the rule
of lenity "does not preclude the implementation of the criminal law every
time a statute needs construction, for all enactments require elucida-
tion."62 Accordingly, because section 1708 is not ambiguous but merely
requires elucidation, it was unnecessary to apply the rule of lenity, and
thus, the statute could be interpreted broadly to include theft of misad-
dressed mail.
Judge Easterbrook has invented a distinction between statutes that are
"ambiguous" and those that merely require "elucidation." 63 When a
statute is vague, courts may declare it constitutionally invalid under the
void-for-vagueness doctrine.' When a statute is not vague but merely
ambiguous, the statute remains valid, but the rule of lenity restricts the
statute's meaning to that which should have been foreseen. 65 Judge Eas-
terbrook's functional view of the rule of lenity adds a third step to this
hierarchy in which the rule of lenity is not triggered when a statute
merely requires elucidation.
Judge Easterbrook's distinction between statutes that are ambiguous
and those that merely require elucidation poses an obvious and troubling
question: when does a statute that requires interpretation rise to the level
of ambiguity? Arguably, in the context of statutory interpretation, a stat-
ute requiring elucidation is an ambiguous statute. Moreover, the distinc-
tion between ambiguity and elucidation merely arms the judiciary with
the dangerous power arbitrarily to circumvent the rule of lenity and the
essential functions it serves.
The second premise of Judge Easterbrook's argument was that the
functions of the rule of lenity will not be served by a "crabbed reading"66
of the term "mail." It is curious, then, that he acknowledged the three
basic functions of the rule of lenity-notice, separation of powers and the
rule of law-but attempted to refute, albeit improperly, only the notice
delivered to the proper addressee.'" Palmer, 864 F.2d at 526 (quoting Douglas, 668 F.2d
at 461 n.3) (emphasis added).
62. Palmer, 864 F.2d at 527.
63. See id.
64. See Jeffries, supra note 25, at 195-96, 206. The void-for-vagueness doctrine man-
dates that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally v. General Con-
str. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
65. See Jeffries, supra note 25, at 206.
66. See United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
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function.67 Judge Easterbrook determined that notice was satisfied be-
cause, even if defendants were not on notice that their conduct violated
section 1708, they were on notice that their conduct was unlawful under
a complementary statute, section 1702, or under state law.6 8 He rea-
soned that because the penalty provisions of section 1702 and section
1708 are identical and the penalties for felony theft under the law of most
states are even greater, applying the rule of lenity to section 1708 would
simply transfer the prosecution to section 1702 or to state law leading to
the same or even greater penalty. 69
If defendants' conduct violated section 1702 and Judge Easterbrook
believed that a reading of section 1702 would place defendants on notice
that their acts were unlawful, the defendants should have been prose-
cuted under section 1702, not section 1708. Because defendants were
indicted under section 1708, not section 1702, defendants should have
had specific notice that their conduct violated section 1708. Moreover, if
section 1708 is not ambiguous, as Judge Easterbrook has determined,
then a reading of that section would have provided the requisite notice.
It is puzzling then that Judge Easterbrook imputed notice under section
1702 to section 1708. He probably did so because section 1708 is ambig-
uous and a reading of that statute would not have provided the requisite
notice. Therefore, the rule of lenity should have been invoked.
Judge Easterbrook could have avoided the conflict between the rule of
lenity and a broad interpretation of section 1708 by concluding that the
statute's legislative history, which indicates that the statute was con-
ceived to protect the "sanctity and integrity" of the mail,70 removed the
ambiguity in the statute. This would have rendered the rule of lenity
inapplicable,7' but Judge Easterbrook did not consider this alternative.
Instead, Judge Easterbrook interpreted the statute broadly by improperly
manipulating a basic and essential canon of statutory construction that is
deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. 72
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See supra note 3.
71. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. Such a determination might be
improper for two reasons. First, this legislative history may be too broad to remove
ambiguity from the statute. Second, the legislature that proffered this language did so in
amending section 1708 to increase the penalty for its violation, over one hundred years
after it was originally enacted.
This alternative justification for interpreting section 1708 broadly, however, is less ob-
jectionable than Judge Easterbrook's manipulation of the rule of lenity.
72. Support for the rule of lenity, however, has waned somewhat in recent years. One
commentator argued that "strict construction no longer commands the allegiance of the
courts," and therefore, "rejection of strict construction in itself [is] unobjectionable." Jef-
fries, supra note 25, at 219.
The same commentator argues that the theory of separation of powers should not
guide judicial interpretation of criminal law because "[p]enal legislation exists in such
abundance that wholesale judicial creativity is simply unnecessary." Id. at 202. Often,
notice is unrealistic because publication of a statute's text without further government
19891
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IV. SECTION 1708 SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THEFT OF
MISADDRESSED MAIL
Notwithstanding the conflict between the rule of lenity and a broad
interpretation of section 1708, the policy reasons for applying the statute
to theft of misaddressed mail are sound. First, the stated legislative pur-
pose of the statute is to protect the sanctity and integrity of the mails.
3
Interpreting section 1708 to include theft of misaddressed mail satisfies
this purpose by encouraging the unintended recipient to return the mis-
addressed article to the Postal Service. T
Second, although the sender has erred when mail is misaddressed,
either by negligently addressing the envelope or by not knowing where
the addressee currently resides,75 the unintended recipient is in the best
position to spot the error and correct it. Therefore, the efficiency of the
postal system would be enhanced by encouraging the unintended recipi-
effort to apprise people of the content of the law is deemed sufficient notice. See id. at
207. The notice concept is also unrealistic because most often trained lawyers are needed
to determine whether an act violates a statute and even they find statutory interpretation
time-consuming and tricky. See id. at 208. The rule of law does not support the tradi-
tional rule of strict construction because strict construction does not bear any necessary
or predictable relation to the concerns suggested by the rule of law. See id. at 219.
The rule of lenity, therefore, no longer fits the pattern of the business of judging and
what is left of the rule is closer to a slogan than to a practice. See id. at 244.
Moreover, "Where public or social interest in penal legislation is especially great, the
policy of giving penal laws a very strict construction may be relaxed." 3 N. Singer, supra
note 17, § 59.05, at 33. More specifically, the author asserted that there is great social or
public interest in penal legislation regarding matters of public health and safety and or-
ganized crime. See id. Arguably, there is little public or social interest in protecting
against theft of misaddressed mail. Therefore, strict construction should not be relaxed.
73. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
74. Avoiding criminal prosecution under section 1708 would provide this encourage-
ment. See United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524,' 527 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3166 (1989).
75. In the case of misdelivered mail the Postal Service, not the sender, has erred.
Therefore, if the scope of section 1708 is analyzed in terms of the source of the error, it is
arguable that a broader interpretation of the statute is warranted when mail is misdeliv-
ered, but in the case of misaddressed mail, only where a proper change-of-address form is
filed. However, the proper analysis should focus on who can correct the error, not who
made the error.
Even the Ninth Circuit, which adheres to the restrictive view of misaddressed mail,
holds that section 1708 applies to out-of-date mail if a change-of-address form is on file.
See United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). This
exception is logical because it recognizes that in this limited circumstance, the Postal
.Service has received express notice under its own procedures that the addressee has
moved. See United States Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual § 159.132 (Mar. 19,
1989) (codified at 39 C.F.R. § 159.132) (hereinafter Postal Service Manual). Therefore,
the Postal Service should not be relieved of its duty over that article of mail by a mere
delivery to the address indicated by the sender.
The holding in Palmer, however, is not limited to out-of-date mail when a change-of-
address form has been filed, but rather extends application of the statute to all cases
involving misaddressed mail. The court stated that "§ 1708 applies to misaddressed
mail," without limiting its holding to out-of-date mail when a proper change-of-address
form is filed. See Palmer, 864 F.2d at 527.
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ent to cooperate, not by punishing the sender or intended recipient for an
excusable error.
Third, although there is no affirmative duty on the part of the Postal
Service to locate the intended recipient of misaddressed mail, absent the
filing of a change-of-address form,76 the Postal Service appears to be obli-
gated to attempt to return the misaddressed mail to the sender if it is
unable to locate the intended recipient.77 The Postal Service's internal
regulations indicate that the obligations of the Postal Service do not end
after it initially delivers misaddressed mail to the address on the envel-
ope.78 Combining both types of misaddressed mail-out-of-date mail
and typographical errors79-in a category entitled "Mail Undeliverable-
as-Addressed," 8 the regulations state that "mail that is undeliverable as
addressed may be forwarded, returned to the sender, or treated as dead
mail."81
It would be impossible for the Postal Service to locate the intended
recipient, as mandated by the regulations, if the unintended recipient re-
tained possession of the misaddressed mail because the Postal Service has
no initial obligation to determine whether the intended recipient resides
at the address on the envelope. Furthermore, the practical realities of
sending, delivering and receiving mail in today's anonymous urban envi-
ronment make it impractical to expect the Postal Service to be aware that
the intended addressee does not reside at the address on the envelope. 82
Another mechanism, therefore, must be used to promote compliance
with the regulatory mandate and improve the chances that the misad-
dressed article will reach the intended recipient. An interpretation of the
76. See United States v. Birnstihl, 441 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir. 1971); Postal Service
Manual, supra note 75, § 159.132.
77. See Postal Service Manual, supra note 75, §§ 159.11 (b), (c), 159.151, exhibits
159.15la-f; United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3166 (1989). Because the misaddressed article remains under the Postal Service's
authority after it is initially delivered to the wrong address, the return addressee (sender)
may be viewed as the new addressee under section 1708.
78. See Postal Service Manual, supra note 75, §§ 159.11 (b), (c), 159.151, exhibits
159.151a-f.
79. See supra note 8.
80. See Postal Service Manual, supra note 75, § 159.11 (b), (c).
81. Id. at § 159.151. The treatment depends on what is authorized for that particular
class of mail. See id. at exhibits 159.15la-f. The Postal Service regulations appear to
require that if the sender is known, first class mail will either be forwarded or returned to
the sender depending on the sender's endorsement. Only if the sender is unknown, the
misaddressed article can be classified as dead mail, and the Postal Service will have no
further obligation after initial delivery. See id. at exhibit 159.151a.
82. See Smith v. United States, 343 F.2d 539, 542 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
361 (1965). "[T]he sheer volume of mail ... has.., fostered an anonymity between
today's mail carriers and addressees that was not characteristic of the relationship be-
tween postriders and our founding fathers." United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 83, 88 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 921 (1972). For example, over 147 billion pieces of mail were
handled by the Postal Service in 1986, an increase of approximately one thousand percent
since 1900. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of
the United States at 520 (108th ed. 1988).
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federal mail theft statute that encourages the unintended recipient to re-
turn misaddressed mail to the Postal Service would provide such a
mechanism.8 3
Finally, Judge Easterbrook's well-conceived analysis based on the in-
terests of the parties further supports the inclusion of theft of misad-
dressed mail under the purview of section 1708.84 Judge Easterbrook
reasoned that the consequences of misaddressed and misdelivered mail
are identical from the perspectives of the sender, unintended recipient,
intended recipient and the postal system." Moreover, courts agree that
the statute applies to theft of misdelivered mail and no court has given a
persuasive reason for applying the statute differently for misaddressed
mail.8 6 Therefore, section 1708 should apply to theft of misaddressed
mail as well.8
7
83. See United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 3166 (1989).
84. See id.
85. See id.; supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
86. See Palmer, 864 F.2d at 527.
87. See id. There are two causes of misaddressed mail; either the sender has incor-
rectly addressed the article, perhaps due to a typographical error, or the sender has used
an out-of-date address. After scrutinizing the four circuit court cases that have dealt with
misaddressed mail, a pattern emerges along these lines. In each case involving an out-of-
date address, the courts have held that the theft violated the statute. See, e.g., id.; United
States v. Douglas, 668 F.2d 459, 461 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982). In
each case involving an incorrect address, the scope of the statute was limited to exclude
thefts of misaddressed mail. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 387 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir.
1968); Goodman v. United States, 341 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1965) (per curiam). To
conclude that the statute should be interpreted along these lines, including theft of out-of-
date mail under the statute, but excluding thefts of incorrectly addressed articles, would
be improper.
The circuit courts that have addressed the issue of whether theft of misaddressed mail
violates the statute have not limited their holdings to the facts before them and have
chosen to promulgate broad holdings covering all instances of misaddressed mail. See
United States v. Palmer, 864 F.2d 524, 527-28 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3166 (1989); Douglas, 668 F.2d at 461; Alien, 387 F.2d at 642-43; Goodman, 341 F.2d at
273.
In Goodman and Allen, where the Fifth Circuit refused to apply section 1708 to misad-
dressed mail, the sender had erred by improperly addressing the envelope. Reversing the
convictions in both cases, the Fifth Circuit not only failed to recognize a distinction be-
tween the two types of misaddressed mail, it also did not discuss whether a broader inter-
pretation of the statute is warranted for misaddressed mail at all. See Allen, 387 F.2d at
642-43; Goodman, 341 F.2d at 372-73.
In addition, in Palmer and Douglas, the two out-of-date mail cases holding that theft of
misaddressed mail is a section 1708 violation, the courts did not limit their holdings to
outdated mail. Although the Palmer court did acknowledge that the different types exist,
stating "[w]e must decide whether converting the contents of an envelope violates § 1708
when the envelope was delivered to an outdated address," Palmer, 864 F.2d at 525 (em-
phasis added), the court properly held "that § 1708 applies to misaddressed mail" with-
out any qualification that its holding is limited to out-of-date mail. See id. at 527.
Furthermore, this pattern is not supported by at least one district court case holding
that theft of an out-of-date article was not a section 1708 violation. United States v.
Askey, 108 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D. Tex. 1952).
The pattern among the four circuit court cases involving misaddressed mail, therefore,
does not affect the proper application of the statute to all misaddressed mail cases.
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CONCLUSION
The realities of sending, delivering and receiving mail in today's anon-
ymous urban environment demand reappraisal of the scope of the federal
mail theft statute. When mail is misaddressed, the unintended recipient
must be encouraged to return the misaddressed article to the Postal Ser-
vice. Application of section 1708 to misaddressed mail would provide
such incentive because the unintended recipient could avoid criminal
prosecution by returning the misaddressed article.
Although such a flexible interpretation of section 1708 is strongly sup-
ported by public policy, this interpretation cannot be advanced without
offending the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity cannot be disregarded,
however, because it serves many essential functions and it continues to be
applied by the United States Supreme Court.
While Judge Easterbrook, in United States v. Palmer, held that theft of
misaddressed mail is a section 1708 violation, he improperly circum-
vented the rule of lenity by adopting a functional view of the rule that is
poorly reasoned, incompletely analyzed and without precedent. Judge
Easterbrook failed to consider that the legislative history of section 1708
could be interpreted as removing ambiguity in the statute, obviating ap-
plication of the rule of lenity. Instead, Judge Easterbrook adopted the
only other approach that allowed him to construe the statute broadly
without irrefutably conflicting with the rule of lenity. His proposal is
improper, however, and the Palmer decision has created a means by
which the judiciary can circumvent this essential canon of statutory
construction.
The only available solution is legislative action. Because the argu-
ments for interpreting section 1708 to include theft of misaddressed mail
are compelling and the rule of lenity prohibits such an interpretation,
Congress should amend the federal mail theft statute to eliminate this
conflict.
Edward L. Hammer
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